Abstract. The fault tolerance theories by Arora and Kulkarni [3] and by Jhumka et al.
Introduction
It is an established engineering method in computer science to generate complicated things from simpler things. This technique has been applied in the area of fault-tolerant distributed systems. The goal is to start off with a system which is not fault-tolerant for certain kinds of faults and use a sound procedure to transform it into a program which is fault-tolerant. To this end, Arora and Kulkarni [3] developed a theory of fault tolerance, whereby fault tolerance is achieved by composing a fault-intolerant program with two types of fault tolerance components called detectors and correctors. Intuitively, a detector is used to detect a certain (error) condition on the system state and a corrector is used to bring the system into a valid state again. Since common fault tolerance methods like triple modular redundancy or error correcting codes can be modeled by using detectors and correctors, the theory can be viewed as an abstraction of many existing fault tolerance techniques.
Kulkarni and Arora [9] and more recently Jhumka et al. [8] proposed methods to automate the addition of detectors and correctors to a fault-intolerant program. The basic idea of these methods is to perform a state space analysis of the fault-affected program and change its transition relation in such a way that it still satisfies its (weakened) specification in the presence of faults. These changes result in either the removal of transitions to satisfy a safety specification or the addition of transitions to satisfy a liveness specification. A critical prerequisite for this to work is the assumption that the correctness specifications are fusion closed.
Fusion closure means that the next step of a program merely depends on the current state and not on the previous history of the execution. For example, given a program with a single variable x ∈ N, then the specification "never x = 1" is fusion closed while the specification "x = 4 implies that previously x = 2" is not. Specifications written in the popular Unity Logic [5] are fusion closed [7] , as are specifications consisting of state transition systems (like C programs). But general temporal logic formulas which are usually used in the area of faulttolerant program synthesis and refinement [4, 11, 12] are not. Arora and Kulkarni [3, p. 75] originally argued that this assumption is not restrictive in the sense that for every non-fusion closed specification there exists an "equivalent" specification which is fusion closed if it is allowed to add history variables to the program. History variables are additional control variables which are used to record the previous state sequence of an execution and hence can be used to answer the question of, e.g., "has the program been in state x = 2?". Using such a history variable h the example above which was not fusion closed can be rephrased in a fusion-closed fashion as "never (x = 4 and (x = 2) ∈ h)". However, these history variables add states to the program.
There are obvious "brute force" approaches on how to add history information like the one sketched above where the history variable remembers the entire previous state sequence of an execution. However, history variables must be implemented which is costly since they exponentially enlarge the state space of the fault-intolerant program. So, we are interested in adding as little additional states as possible.
In this paper, we present a method to add history states to a program in a way which avoids exponential growth of the state space, but rather causes a polynomial increase in the size of the state space in the worst case. More specifically, we start with a problem specification SPEC 1 which is not fusion closed, a program Σ 1 which satisfies SPEC 1 and a class of faults F . Depending on F we show how to transform SPEC 1 and Σ 1 into SPEC 2 and Σ 2 in such a way that (a) SPEC 2 is fusion closed, (b) Σ 2 can be made fault tolerant for SPEC 2 iff Σ 1 can be made fault tolerant for SPEC 1 , and (c) Σ 2 is (in a certain sense) minimal with respect to the added states. We restrict our attention to cases where SPEC is a safety property and therefore are only concerned with what Arora and Kulkarni call fail-safe fault tolerance [3] . The programs which we consider are non-deterministic state machines and so our application domain is that of distributed or concurrent systems.
The benefit of the proposed method is the following: Firstly, it makes the methods which automatically add detectors [8, 9] amendable to specifications which are not fusion closed and closes a gap in the applicability of the detector/corrector theory [3] . And secondly, the presented method offers further insight into the efficiency of the basic mechanisms which are applied in fault tolerance.
The paper is structured as follows: We first present some preliminary definitions in Section 2 and then discuss the assumption of fusion closure in Section 3. In Section 4 we study specifications which are not fusion closed and sketch a method which makes these types of specifications efficiently manageable in the context of automated methods which add fault tolerance. Finally, Section 5 presents some open problems and directions for future work. For lack of space, we only give proof sketches for theorems and lemmas. The detailed proofs can be found in the full version of this work [6] .
Formal Preliminaries
States, Traces and Properties. The state space of a program is an unstructured finite nonempty set C of states. A state predicate over C is a boolean predicate over C. A state transition over C is a pair (r, s) of states from C.
In the following, let C be a state set and T be a state transition set. We define a trace over C to be a non-empty sequence s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , . . . of states over C. We sometimes use the notation s i to refer to the i-th element of a trace. Note that traces can be finite or infinite. We will always use Greek letters to denote traces and normal lowercase letters to denote states. For two traces α and β, we write α · β to mean the concatenation of the two traces. We say that a transition t occurs in some trace σ if there exists an i such that (s i , s i+1 ) = t.
We define a property over C to be a set of traces over C. A trace σ satisfies a property P iff σ ∈ P . If σ does not satisfy P we say that σ violates P . There are two important types of properties called safety and liveness [2, 10] . In this paper, we are only concerned with safety properties. Informally spoken, a safety property demands that "something bad never happens" [10] , i.e., it rules out a set of unwanted trace prefixes. Mutual exclusion and deadlock freedom are two prominent examples of safety properties. Formally, a property S over C is a safety property iff for each trace σ which violates S there exists a prefix α of σ such that for all traces β, α · β violates S.
Programs, Specifications and Correctness. We define programs as state transition systems consisting of a state set C, a set of initial states I ⊆ C and a transition relation T over C, i.e., a program (sometimes also called system) is a triple Σ = (C, I, T ). The state predicate I together with the state transition set T describe a safety property S, i.e., all traces which are constructable by starting in a state in I and using only state transitions from T . We denote this property by safety-prop(Σ). For brevity, we sometimes write Σ instead of safety-prop(Σ). A state s ∈ C of a program Σ is reachable iff there exists a trace σ ∈ Σ such that s occurs in σ. Otherwise s is non-reachable. Sometimes we will call a nonreachable state redundant.
We define specifications to be properties, i.e., a specification over C is a property over C. A safety specification is a specification which is a safety property. Unlike Arora and Kulkarni [3] , we do not assume that problem specifications are fusion closed. Fusion closure is defined as follows: Let C be a state set, s ∈ C, X be property over C, α, γ finite state sequences, and β, δ, σ be state sequences over C. A set X is fusion closed if the following holds: If α · s · β and γ · s · δ are in X then α · s · δ and γ · s · β are also in X.
It is easy to see that for every program Σ holds that safety-prop(Σ) is fusion closed. Intuitively, fusion closure means that the entire history of every trace is present in every state of the trace. We will give examples for fusion closed and not fusion closed specifications later.
We say that program Σ satisfies specification SPEC iff all traces in Σ satisfy SPEC. Consequently, we say that Σ violates SPEC iff there exists a trace σ ∈ Σ which violates SPEC.
Extensions. Given some program Σ 1 = (C 1 , I 1 , T 1 ) our goal is to define the notion of a fault-tolerant version Σ 2 of Σ 1 meaning that Σ 2 does exactly what Σ 1 does in fault-free scenarios and has additional fault tolerance abilities which Σ 1 lacks. Sometimes, Σ 2 = (C 2 , I 2 , T 2 ) will have additional states (i.e., C 2 ⊃ C 1 ) and for this case we must define what these states "mean" with respect to the original program Σ 1 . This is done using a state projection function π : C 2 → C 1 which tells which states of Σ 2 are "the same" with respect to states of Σ 1 . A state projection function can be naturally extended to traces and properties, e.g., for a trace
We say that a program Σ 1 = (C 1 , I 1 , T 1 ) extends a program Σ 2 = (C 2 , I 2 , T 2 ) using state projection π iff the following conditions hold:
π is a total mapping from C 2 to C 1 (for simplicity we assume that for any s ∈ C 1 holds that π(s) = s), and 3. π(safety-prop(Σ 2 )) = safety-prop(Σ 1 ).
If Σ 2 extends Σ 1 using π and Σ 1 satisfies SPEC then obviously π(Σ 2 ) satisfies SPEC. When it is clear from the context that Σ 2 extends Σ 1 we will simply say that Σ 2 satisfies SPEC instead of "π(Σ 2 ) satisfies SPEC".
Fault Models. We define a fault model F as being a program transformation, i.e., a mapping F from programs to programs. We require that a fault model does not tamper with the set of initial states, i.e., we rule out "immediate" faults that occur before the system is switched on. We also restrict ourselves to the case where F "adds" transitions, since this is the only way to violate a safety specification. Formally, a fault model is a mapping F which maps a program Σ = (C, I, T ) to a program F (Σ) = (F (C), F (I), F (T )) such that the following conditions hold:
The resulting program is called the fault-affected version or the program in the presence of faults. We say that a program Σ is F -intolerant with respect to SPEC iff Σ satisfies SPEC but F (Σ) violates SPEC.
Given two programs Σ 1 and Σ 2 such that Σ 2 extends Σ 1 and a fault model F , it makes sense to assume that F treats Σ 1 and Σ 2 in a "similar way". Basically, this means that F should at least add the same transitions to Σ 1 and Σ 2 . But with respect to the possible new states of Σ 2 it can possibly add new fault transitions. This models faults which occur within the error detection and correction mechanisms. Formally, a fault model F must be extension monotonic, i.e., for any two programs Σ 1 = (C 1 , I 1 , T 1 ) and Σ 2 = (C 2 , I 2 , T 2 ) such that Σ 2 extends Σ 1 using π holds: An example is given in Fig. 1 . The original system is given at the top and the extension is given below (the state projection is implied by vertical orientation, i.e., states which are vertically aligned are mapped to the same state by π). In the left example the fault model is extension monotonic since all fault transitions in Σ 1 are also in Σ 2 . The right example is not extension monotonic. Intuitively, an extension monotonic fault model maintains at least its original transitions over extensions.
The extension monotonicity requirement does not restrict faulty behavior on the new states of the extension. However, we have to restrict this type of behavior since it would be impossible to build fault-tolerant versions otherwise.
In this paper we assume a very general type of restriction: it basically states that in any infinite sequence of extensions of the original program there is always some point where F does not introduce new fault transitions anymore. Formally, an extension monotonic fault model F is finite iff for any infinite sequence of programs Σ 1 , Σ 2 , . . . such that for all i, Σ i+1 extends Σ i holds that there exists a j such that for all k ≥ j no new fault transition is introduced in Σ k , i.e.,
Finite fault models are those for which infinite redundancy is not needed for fault tolerance. We assume our fault model to be finite and extension monotonic.
Fault-tolerant Versions. Now we are able to define a fault-tolerant version. It captures the idea of starting with some program Σ 1 which is fault-intolerant regarding a specification SPEC and some fault model F . A fault-tolerant version Σ 2 of Σ 1 is a program which has the same behavior as Σ 1 if no faults occur, but additionally satisfies SPEC in the presence of faults. Formally, a program Σ 2 the F -tolerant version of program Σ 1 for SPEC using state projection π iff the following conditions hold:
In the remainder of this paper, F is a fault model, Σ, Σ 1 and Σ 2 are programs, SPEC, SPEC 1 and SPEC 2 are specifications.
Problem Statement
The basic task we would like to solve is to construct a fault-tolerant version for a given program and a safety specification.
Definition 1 (general fail-safe transformation problem). Given a program Σ which is F -intolerant with respect to a general safety specification SPEC. The general fail-safe transformation problem consists of finding a fault-tolerant version of Σ.
Solutions for Fusion-Closed Specifications. The basic mechanism which Kulkarni and Arora [9] and Jhumka et al. [8] apply is the creation of non-reachable transitions. Both approaches assume that SPEC is fusion closed which implies that safety specifications can be concisely represented by a set of "bad" transitions [3, 7] . Since F (Σ) violates SPEC, there must exist executions in which a specified bad transition occurs, which must be prevented. So, for all bad transitions t = (d, b) the mentioned approaches make either state d or state b unreachable in F (Σ 2 ). If this is impossible without changing the behavior of Σ, then no fault-tolerant version exists.
Adding History Variables. Consider program with one variable x which can take five different values (integers 0 to 4) and simply proceeds from state x = 0 to x = 4 through all intermediate states. The fault assumption F has added one transition from x = 1 to x = 3 to the transition relation. Now consider the correctness specification SPEC = "always (x = 4 implies that previously x = 2)". Note that F (Σ) does not satisfy SPEC (i.e., F (Σ) can reach state x = 4 without having been in state x = 2), and that SPEC is not fusion closed. To see the latter, consider the two traces 0, 3, 2, 4 and 2, 3, 4 from SPEC. The fusion at state x = 3 yields trace 0, 3, 4 which is not in SPEC. Since SPEC is not fusion closed, we cannot apply the known transformation methods [8, 9] .
The specification can be made fusion closed by adding a history variable h which records the entire state history. Now SPEC can be rephrased as SPEC = "always (x = 4 implies 2 ∈ h)" or, equivalently: SPEC = "never (x = 4 and 2 ∈ h)" Now we can identify a set of bad transitions which must be prevented, e.g., from state x = 3 ∧ h = 1 to state x = 4 ∧ h = 1, 3 . In this way bad transitions are prevented and the modified system satisfies SPEC in the presence faults.
Problems with History Variables. Adding a history variable h in the previous example adds states to the state space of the system. In fact, defining the domain of h as the set of all sequences over {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} adds infinitely many states. Clearly this can be reduced by the observation that if faults do not corrupt h, then h will only take on five different values ( , 1 , 1, 2 , 1, 2, 3 , and 1, 2, 3, 4 ). But still, the state space has been increased from five states to 5 2 = 25 states.
Note that Σ 2 has redundant states and Σ is not redundant at all. So the redundancy is due to the history variable h. But even if the domain of h has cardinality 5, the redundancy is in a certain sense not minimal, as we now explain.
Consider the program Σ 3 depicted in Figure 2 . It tolerates the fault f by adding only one state to the state space of Σ (namely, x = 5). Note that Σ 3 has only one redundant state, so Σ 3 can be regarded as redundancy-minimal with respect to SPEC. The metric used for minimality is the number of redundant states. We want to exploit this observation to deal with the general case.
Beyond Fusion Closure
Although the automated procedures of [8, 9] were developed for fusion-closed specifications, they (may) still work for specifications which are not fusion closed only if the fault model has a certain pleasant form. For example, consider the system in Figure 3 and the specification SPEC = "(e implies previously c) and (never g)" Obviously, the fault model F can be tolerated using the known transformation methods because F does not "exploit" the part of the specification which is not fusion closed. Fig. 3 . The fail-safe transformation can be successful even if the specification is not fusion closed. The specification in this case is "(e implies previously c) and (never g)".
Exploiting Non-Fusion Closure. Now we formalize what it means for a fault model to "exploit" the fact that a specification is not fusion-closed (we call this property non-fusion closure). First we define what it means for a trace to be the fusion of two other traces. If SPEC is a set of traces, we recursively define an operator to generate the fusion closure of SPEC, denoted by fusion-closure(SPEC). It produces a set which is closed under finite applications of the fusion operator.
Definition 3 (fusion closure). Given a specification SPEC, a trace σ is in fusion-closure(SP EC) iff 1. σ is in SPEC, or 2. σ = fusion(α, s, β) for traces α, β ∈ fusion-closure(SPEC) and a state s in α and β.
Lemma 1 guarantees that every trace in fusion-closure(SPEC) which is not in SPEC has a "normal form", i.e., it can be represented uniquely as the sequence of fusions of traces in SPEC. This is shown in the following theorem. Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of how σ evolved from traces in SPEC. Basically this means an induction on the number of fusion points in σ. The induction step assumes that σ is the fusion of two traces which have at most n fusion points and depending on their relative positions uses the rules of Lemma 1 to construct the normal form for σ. Now consider the system depicted in Figure 4 . The corresponding specification is: SPEC = "f implies previously d". The system may exhibit the following two traces in the absence of faults, namely α = a · b · c and β = a · d · e · f . In the presence of faults, a new trace is possible, namely γ = a · b · e · f . Observe that γ violates SPEC and that γ is the fusion of two traces α, β ∈ SPEC (the state which plays the role of s in Definition 2 is state e). In such a case we say that fault model F exploits the non-fusion closure of SPEC. Fig. 4 . Example where the non-fusion closure of a specification is exploited by a fault model. The specification is "f implies previously d".
Definition 4 (exploiting non-fusion closure). Let Σ satisfy SPEC. Then F (Σ) exploits the non-fusion closure of SPEC iff there exists a trace σ ∈ F (Σ) such that σ ∈ SPEC and σ ∈ fusion-closure(SPEC).
Intuitively, exploiting the non-fusion closure means that there exists a bad computation (σ ∈ SPEC) that can potentially "impersonate" a good computation (σ ∈ fusion-closure(SPEC)). Definition 4 states that F causes a violation of SPEC by constructing a fusion of two (allowed) traces. Given a fault model F such that F (Σ) exploits the non-fusion closure of SPEC, then also we say that the non-fusion closure of SPEC is exploited for Σ in the presence of F .
Obviously, if for some specification SPEC and system Σ such an F exists, then SPEC is not fusion closed. Similarly trivial to prove is the observation that no fault model F can exploit the non-fusion closure of a specification which is fusion closed.
On the other hand, if the non-fusion closure of SPEC cannot be exploited, this does not necessarily mean that SPEC is fusion closed. To see this consider Figure 5 . The correctness specification SPEC of the program is "c implies previously a". Obviously, a fault model can only generate traces that begin with a. Since a is an initial state and we assume that initial states are not changed by F , no F can exploit the non-fusion closure. But SPEC is not fusion closed.
b c a Fig. 5 . Example where the non-fusion closure cannot be exploited but the specification is not fusion closed. The specification is "c implies previously a".
Preventing the Exploitation of Non-Fusion Closure. The fact that a fault model may not exploit the non-fusion closure of a specification will be important in our approach to solve the general fail-safe transformation problem (Def. 1). A method to solve this problem, i.e., that of finding a fault-tolerant version Σ 2 , should be a generally applicable method, which constructs Σ 2 from Σ 1 (this is depicted in the top part of Figure 6 ). Instead of devising such a method from scratch, our aim is to reuse the existing transformations to add fail-safe fault tolerance which are based on fusion-closed specifications [8, 9] . This approach is shown in the bottom part of Figure 6 . Starting from Σ 1 , we construct some intermediate program Σ 2 and some intermediate fusion-closed specification SPEC 2 to which we apply one of the above mentioned methods for fusion-closed specifications [8, 9] . The construction of Σ 2 and SPEC 2 must be done in such a way that the resulting program satisfies the properties of the general transformation problem stated in Definition 1. How can this be done?
The idea of our approach is the following: First, choose SPEC 2 to be the fusion closure of SPEC 1 , i.e., choose SPEC 2 = fusion-closure(SPEC 1 ) and construct Σ 2 from Σ 1 in such a way that F (Σ 2 ) does not exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC 1 . More precisely, Σ 2 results from applying an algorithm (which we give below) which ensures that -Σ 2 extends Σ 1 using some state projection π and -F (Σ 2 ) does not exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC 1 .
Our claim, which we formally prove later, is that the program Σ 2 resulting from applying (for example) the algorithms of [8, 9] to Σ 2 with respect to SPEC 2 in fact satisfies the requirements of Definition 1, i.e., Σ 2 is in fact an F -tolerant version of Σ 1 with respect to SPEC 1 . Fig. 6 . Overview of transformation problem (top) and our approach (bottom). Algorithm 1 described in this paper offers a solution to the first step (i.e., Σ1 → Σ 2 ).
Bad Fusion Points. For a given system Σ and a specification SPEC, how can we tell whether or not the nature of SPEC is exploitable by a fault model? For the negative case (where it can be exploited), we give a sufficient criterion. It is based on the notion of a bad fusion point.
Definition 5 (bad fusion point). Let Σ be F -intolerant with respect to SPEC. State s of Σ is a bad fusion point of Σ for SPEC in the presence of F iff there exist traces α, β ∈ SPEC such that 1. s is a fusion point of α and β, 2. fusion(α, s, β) ∈ F (Σ), and 3. fusion(α, s, β) ∈ SPEC.
Intuitively, a bad fusion point is a state in which "multiple pasts" may have happened, i.e., there may be two different execution paths passing through s, and from the point of view of the specification it is important to tell the difference. We now give several examples of bad fusion points.
As an example, consider Fig. 4 where e is a bad fusion point. To instantiate the definition, take α = a · b · e ∈ F (Σ) and β = a · d · e · f ∈ F (Σ). The fusion at e yields the trace a · b · e · f which is not in SPEC.
Theorem 2 (bad fusion point criterion). The following two statements are equivalent:
1. Σ has no bad fusion point for SPEC in the presence of F .
F (Σ)
does not exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC.
Proof. The main difficulty is to prove that if SPEC has no bad fusion point then F (Σ) cannot exploit the non-fusion closure. We prove this by assuming that F (Σ) exploits the non-fusion closure and using Theorem 1 to construct a bad fusion point.
Removal of Bad Fusion Points. Theorem 2 states that it is both necessary and sufficient to remove all bad fusion points from Σ to make its structure robust against fault models that exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC. So how can we get rid of bad fusion points?
Recall that a bad fusion point is one which has multiple pasts, and from the point of view of the specification, it is necessary to distinguish between those pasts. Thus, the basic idea of our method is to introduce additional states which split the fusion paths. This is sketched in Figure 7 . Let Σ 1 = (C 1 , I 1 , T 1 ) be a system. If s is a bad fusion point of Σ 1 for SPEC, there exists a trace β ∈ SPEC and a trace α ∈ F (Σ) which both go through s.
Algorithm 1 (Removal of Bad Fusion Points) To remove bad fusion points, we now construct an extension Σ 2 = (C 2 , I 2 , T 2 ) of Σ 1 in the following way:
-C 2 = C 1 ∪ {s } where s is a "new" state, -I 2 = I 1 , and -T 2 results from T 1 by "diverting" the transitions of β to and from s instead of s.
The extension is completed by defining the state projection function π to map s to s. Observe that s is not a bad fusion point regarding α and β anymore because α now contains s and β a different state s which cannot be fused. So this procedure gets rid of one bad fusion point. Also, it does not by itself introduce a new one, since s is an extension state which cannot be referenced in SPEC. So we can repeatedly apply the procedure and incrementally build a sequence of extensions Σ 1 , Σ 2 , . . . where in every step one bad fusion point is removed and an additional state is added. However, F may cause new bad fusion points to be created during this process by introducing new faults, transitions defined on the newly added states. But since the fault model is finite it will do this only finitely often. Hence, repeating this construction for every bad fusion point will terminate because we assume that the state space is finite. Note that in the extension process, certain states can be extended multiple times because they might be bad fusion points for different combinations of traces.
We now prove that the above method results in a program with the desired properties. 1. Σ 2 extends Σ 1 using some state projection π and 2. F (Σ 2 ) does not exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC 1 .
Proof. To show the first point we argue that there exists a projection function π (which is induced by our method) such that every fault-free execution of Σ 2 is an execution of Σ 1 . To show the second point, we argue that the method removes all bad fusion points and apply the bad fusion point criterion of Theorem 2.
Correctness of the Combined Method. Starting from a program Σ 1 , Lemma 2 shows that the program Σ 2 resulting from Algorithm 1 for removing bad fusion points enjoys certain properties (see Fig. 6 ). We now prove that starting off from these properties and choosing SPEC 2 as the fusion closure of SPEC 1 , the program Σ 2 , which results from applying the algorithms of [8, 9] on Σ 2 , has the desired properties of the transformation problem (Definition 1).
Lemma 3. Given F , SPEC 1 , and Σ 1 as in Lemma 2, let SPEC 2 be equal to fusion-closure(SPEC 1 ) and let Σ 2 be the result of applying any of the known methods that solve the fusion-closed transformation problem to Σ 2 with respect to F and SPEC 2 , where Σ 2 results from Σ 1 through the application of Algorithm 1. Then the following statements hold:
1. Σ 2 extends Σ 1 using some state projection π. 2. If F (Σ 2 ) satisfies SPEC 2 then F (Σ 2 ) satisfies SPEC 1 .
Proof. To prove the first point we argue that a fault tolerance addition procedure only removes non-reachable transitions. Hence, every fault-free execution of Σ 2 is also an execution of Σ 2 . But since Σ 2 extends Σ 1 so must Σ 2 . To show the second point we first observe that F (Σ 2 ) does not necessarily satisfy SPEC 1 but not all traces for this are in F (Σ 2 ) anymore (due to the removal of bad transitions during addition of fault tolerance). Next we show that any trace of F (Σ 2 ) which violates SPEC 1 must exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC 1 . But this must also be a trace of F (Σ ) and so is ruled out by assumption.
Lemmas 2 and 3 together guarantee that the composition of the method described in Section 1 and the fail-safe transformation methods for fusion-closed specifications in fact solves the transformation problem for non-fusion closed specifications of Definition 1.
